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I. Ti ADMINISTRATrVE CONSTITUTION
A question confronts Florida. It is not a new question; it has been
around as long as administration itself. This quintessential ques-
tion of administrative law involves two competing goals. How are we
to maintain the control over the administrative process compelled by
our constitutional democracy, while at the same time allowing agen-
cies sufficient authority and freedom to carry out the duties they were
created to perform?' Many states, including Florida, have enacted leg-
islation in hopes of striking this elusive balance.'
* Senior Staff Attorney of the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. The author
would like to thank Professor Johnny C. Burris for his review of an earlier draft of this article.
The views expressed here are solely those of the author and are not intended to reflect the views
of the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee or the Florida Legislature.
1. This basic question has, of course, been phrased in many different ways. One commen-
tator has described it as the "quest for a way to secure the reality of regulatory power within the
framework of representative democracy," Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the
Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUU. L. REv. 452, 465 (1989), while others
speak of accommodating competing "liberal" and "progressive" values, Sidney Shapiro & Ri-
chard Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Require-
ment of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 388 (1987). In this
Symposium, Stephen Maher refers to the problem of maintaining direction set by elected policy
makers without creating inefficiency as the "Rubik's Cube" of administrative government. Ste-
phen Maher, Getting Into the Act, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv 277, 287; see generally Louis HARTZ,
Tima LIBERAL TRArnoN IN AMERICA (1955).
2. Florida's Administrative Procedure Act is found in chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
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Florida's Administrative Procedure Act (APA or the Act), as its
name suggests, does not contain substantive law on any particular
subject. Rather it addresses the procedures by which agencies carry
out the responsibilities granted to them in various substantive statutes.
Because a defining characteristic of administrative agencies is that
they perform quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions, as well as
quasi-executive ones,' the Act is necessarily wide in scope. The APA
not only governs the processes by which administrative agencies do
such things as adopt rules,4 issue orders,5 and grant licenses; 6 it also
contains provisions for other entities to oversee, influence, and con-
trol these agency actions under certain circumstances. Independent
hearing officers, for example, are granted authority to issue recom-
mended and final orders. 7 The Administrative Procedures Committee
is given responsibility to oversee agency actions.' The District Courts
of Appeal are assigned powers of judicial review.9 The Act thus estab-
lishes structures, processes, and limitations which govern the exercise
of an agency's statutory powers. ,0
This complex system is designed to ensure that administrative
agency decisions are wise and rational, that they are arrived at in a
fair and open fashion, and that the agency has full legal authority to
make them." In this sense, the APA might be compared to a constitu-
tion, which itself contains little substantive law, but rather establishes
the governmental structures, processes, and limitations which define
how the government will work. Just as Florida's Constitution declares
the limitations within which the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of our government operate, so too the APA may be seen as
3. See General Telephone Co. of Fla. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063,
1066 (Fla. 1984) ("The PSC, as does any other administrative agency, acts in both quasi-legisla-
tive and quasi-judicial capacities."); State v. Whitman, 156 So. 705, 707 (Fla. 1934) (describing
the "new" concept of administrative law); see generally Thomas Sargentich, The Reform of the
American Administrative Process: The Contemporary Delate, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 385, 399"
(1984).
4. FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (1993).
5. Id. § 120.57.
6. Id. § 120.60.
7. Id. §§ 120.54(4)(d), 120.56(5), 120.57(I)(b)9.
8. Id. § 120.545.
9. Id. § 120.68.
10. Not all agency actions are subject to the Act. Numerous actions are excluded from the
definitions of both a rule and an order by sections 120.52(11), (16). There are also countless
"free form" activities which have not yet matured into an action covered by the APA. See
Capeletti Brothers, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 362 So. 2d 346, 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978),
cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1374 (1979).
!1. On the general purposes sought to be achieved through the enactment of administrative
procedure acts, see ARTsR" Bosiam-n, STATE A'nmsTRATrVE RUtE MAKINO, 16-22 (1986).
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providing similar direction to what has been termed "the fourth
branch" of government,12 the administrative agency.
Given the "constitutional" nature of the APA, major amendments
can have significant effects on the structure of Florida's government.
Scholars and judges alike have long recognized that elements of politi-
cal theory lie deeply embedded in administrative law issues. 3 Political
theory, however, can be a boring subject; it is of no concern to the
average citizen, and of only slightly more interest to the legal practi-
tioner. Thus, philosophical debates on such questions are unlikely to
surface in either legal briefs or legislative hearings. Yet the ever-grow-
ing importance of administrative law in our society suggests the wis-
dom of occasionally considering our administrative law system from
this more philosophical perspective. Part II of this Article outlines
three models of administration which have infused administrative law:
the classical model; the procedural model; and the evaluative model. 4
An understanding of these three basic models in their historical con-
text provides a good background from which to examine the provi-
sions of Florida's Act, and to consider proposals for reform.
Florida administrative law has drawn from at least the first two
models, but has not completely endorsed either of them." In Part III,
this Article suggests that the intention of the drafters of the APA to
balance the classical and procedural models has not been completely
successful. The courts have failed to give this balance full effect be-
12. The characterization of administrative agencies as the "fourth branch" of government
is a common one. It is occasionally used pejoratively, "Commissions ... constitute a headless
'fourth branch' of the Government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordi-
nated powers ... ." Kenneth C. Davis & Richard J. Pierce, ADMImisTRATiE LAw TREATISE 12
(1994) (quoting the REPORT OF iE PRESmENT'S COmMrEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAOEMENT)
(1937)). It is intended here simply in a descriptive sense, in recognition of the large role adminis-
trative agencies play in our government.
13. See e.g., James DeLong, New Wine For a New Bottle: Judicial Review in the Regula-
tory State, 72 VA. L. REv. 399 (1986); Marianne Smythe, An Irreverent Look at Regulatory
Reform 38 ADMN. L. REv. 451 (1986).
14. While this particular terminology is original, several scholars have suggested similar
classifications in explaining the histoffcal evolution of federal administrative law. See generally,
KENNETH DAVIS, ADmNSTRATIVE LAW TEXT, 2 (3d ed. 1972) (describing four stages as constitu-
tionalism, judicial review, proceduralism, and informal discretion); Richard Stewart, The Refor-
mation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669 (1975) (describing transmission
belt theory, traditional theory, and interest group theory); Shapiro & Levy, supra note I (de-
scribing three stages as structuralism, proceduralism, and rationalism). There was quite a bit of
commentary written in the 70's and 80's discussing the first two of these models. See Ronald
Cass, Models of Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REV. 363, 364 (1986).
15. When the Florida APA was enacted in 1975, the evaluative model was not yet accepted
at the federal level. While it is difficult to assign specific dates to the rise of a theoretical model,
the evaluative model might be dated from the early 1980's.
1994]
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cause they have relied upon federal cases reflecting the procedural
model, and have seldom been guided by the provisions of the Act on
judicial review.
It is clear from the 1994 Regular Session that many legislators are
deeply concerned about agency rules in Florida and are committed to
greater control over agency rulemaking. 16 While there was general
agreement on this goal, the bills introduced sought to achieve it in
starkly different ways. In some cases, bills seeking general control
were in fact based upon different philosophical approaches. 7 This Ar-
ticle concludes that in some instances the proposed bills had the po-
tential to change the philosophical approach underlying Florida's
APA. If enacted, one bill would have moved Florida down the road
taken by the federal administrative law system, while another would
have moved Florida in the opposite direction. 8
II. THREE MODELS OF ADMINISTRATION
Federal administrative law has successively embraced three different
models of administration. 9 The first, the classical model, lasted from
the beginnings of American administrative law until the 1930's. The
second, the procedural model, then prevailed for nearly fifty years. It,
in turn, was overtaken by the third, the evaluative model, which now
prevails. The assignment of these three models to specific periods does
not imply that they existed to the exclusion of other models, 20 but only
that they were ascendant.
A. The Classical Model
The classical model 21 focuses on power. Legal analysis centers on
who exercises what substantive powers, and on the source of those
16. Select committees in both the House and Senate held hearings on rulemaking and
agency exercise of delegated authority. Five APA bills passed either the Hfouse or the Senate,
though only one minor bill was enacted into law. See Sally Bond Mann, Legislative Reform of
the Administrative Procedure Act: A Tale of Two Committees, 68 FLA. B.J. July/Aug. 1994 at
57, 57-60.
17. See infra notes 146-61 and accompanying text.
18. See discussion of FLA. HB 237 (1994) and FLA. SB 1440, (1994) infra notes 154-61 and
accompanying text. Hopefully, those who agree with the legislative perspective of the problem,
as well as those who disagree, will find this Traveler's Guide helpful in understanding the roads
of reform. Like most roads, each of these may be traveled either forward or backward, depend-
ing on the desired destination.
19. See supra note 14.
20. In fact, elements of each of the models can undoubtedly be found in administrative law
materials from any of the three periods. One writer, who contrasts the "policing model" of
regulation, in vogue before the New Deal, with the "associational model" which then replaced
it, notes that competing approaches were constantly promoted, but without much success. Rob-
ert L. Rabin, Federal Reg. in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986).
21. This period of administrative law also has been described as "constitutional fundamen-
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powers. The model is expressed in the doctrines of separation of pow-
ers, checks and balances, void-for-vagueness, dual federalism, and
standards attached to grants of power. The unifying concept underly-
ing each of these doctrines is the concept that governmental power is a
dangerous commodity, to be carefully distributed and controlled. 22
This is the essence of the classical model. This concept has its roots in
the political philosophies of Locke, Blackstone and Montesquieu, who
wrote in the 18th century before the founding of the Republic, and it
is reflected in the United States Constitution itself.Y
The classical model was predominant from the founding of the Re-
public until the New Deal. The first century of the Republic was a
time of Congressional government with self-executing laws and mini-
mal administration.24 The regulation which existed then was largely
based on common law tort and property principles.2 5 In general, Con-
gress could pass the laws and see to their execution, because of the
limited involvement of government.2 6 The passage of the Interstate
Commerce Act in 1887 heralded the end of this congressional cen-
tury.27 For the first time, there was a delegation of executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial powers into a single entity. 8 While this was a
substantial break from tradition and a particular blow to the
development 9 of the non-delegation doctrine, the classical model of
administrative law still predominated.3 0 The Interstate Commerce Act
contained fairly clear standards regarding the jurisdiction of the com-
talism" Richard Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323 (1987); "structur-
alist," Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1; and "transitive," Edward Rubin, Law and Legislation in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 380 (1989).
22. "Historically, the underlying premise of administrative law has been the limitation of
government power in order to preserve private autonomy." Stewart, supra note 14, at 1811 (cit-
ing Jaffe & Henderson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical Origins 72 L. Q. REV.
345 (1956)).
23. Farina, supra note I, at 488-95; see generally James Freedman, CRisis AND LEGITIMACY:
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 15-20 (1978).
24. THEODORE LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED
STATES, 94 (2d ed. 1979).
25. Rabin, supra note 20, at 1192.
26. Lowi, supra note 24, at 95.
27. Smythe, supra note 13, at 454 (remarking that the full political motivation for this regu-
lation is still not clear).
28. Richard Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 337 (1990).
29. Several commentators have argued that there has never really been a nondelegation doc-
trine at the federal level. Compare Johnny C. Burris, Administrative Law, 1986 Eleventh Circuit
Survey, 38 MERCER L. REV. 991, 993-97 (1987) with Farina, supra note 1, at 479-89 (arguing that
many commentators have underestimated the effect of the doctrine).
30. Farina succinctly characterizes the evolution of nondelegation theory as a shift in tactics
from "power divided to power restrained." Farina supra, note 1, at 478; see also Thomas Mc-
Garity, Regulatory Reform and the Positive State: An Historical Overview, 38 ADMIN L. REV.
399, 401 (1986).
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mission and the type of conduct to be regulated,3 and there was a
substantial history of common law and state regulatory efforts to give
the terms in the statute specific meaning. 2 Similarly, Congress dis-
cussed and came to agreement on all significant policy issues before
enacting the Federal Railway Safety Appliances Act in 1893.11 The leg-
islation itself contained the applicable safety rules. 34
The Supreme Court did not strike down this new type of legislation,
but nevertheless continued its concern with standards and limitation
of power through strict interpretations of statutory language 3 and by
striking down certain actions of the new agencies.36 The role of the
judiciary in the classical model is narrowly active, in that the courts
ensure that agency action is strictly within the scope of the agency's
authority. Apart from this function, review is deferential. The classi-
cal model asserted that an agency may act only within the substantive
boundaries set forth in its statutory grant from Congress, and that it
is the courts which determine the scope of this authority through in-
terpretation of the statute.37 Narrow interpretation of statutory dele-
gations, and the concept of substantive limitations on administrative
power, may be the most important contributions of the classical
model.
B. The Procedural Model
The procedural model" focuses on process. Legal analysis centers
on the way in which administrative decisions are reached. The model
promotes application of expertise 9 and procedural safeguards 4° in de-
31. Lowi notes that later grants of power in the Transportation Act of 1920 were signifi-
cantly more open ended. In his typology of regulatory forms, he also comments that this second
Act preceded other grants of what he terms "control over markets" by nearly 15 years. Lowi,
supra note 24, at 97.
32. Id. at 96.
33. Peter Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 427,428 (1989).
34. Id. at 449.
35. Farina, supra note 1, at 483-86.
36. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920). This approach was to
be followed in many other areas. The courts would declare agency actions illegal as either ultra
vires or inconsistent with statutory purpose, and did not declare the statutes delegating the power
to be unconstitutional. See Johnny C. Burris, Administrative Law, 12 NovA L. REV. 299, 303
(1988).
37. RICHARD J. PIERCE JR. ET AL., ADmNISTRATIV LAW AND PROCESS, 112 (1992).
38. A generally similar classification is made by Davis, supra note 14, at 2; Shapiro & Levy,
supra note 1, at 397. The procedural model has also been termed "traditional," Stewart, supra
note 14, at 1671.
39. For a discussion of the New Deal conception of the expert agency, see Sargentich, supra
note 3, at 411-12.
40. See generally JAMES LANDIS, THE ADwiSTRATivE PRocESS (1938); Davis, supra note
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cision making, rather than external substantive limitations. The proce-
dural model finds expression in concepts of adequate notice,
impartiality, fair hearing, due process, and standards established by
the agency exercising the authority. There are two premises underlying
these concepts. The first is that the questions confronting government
are susceptible to scientific rationality, that is, there are "correct" an-
swers.41 The second premise is that the way administrative decisions
are reached can determine the accuracy of those decisions.42 These
premises of the procedural model had their basis in "legal process"
scholarship, which compared the relative institutional competence of
legislatures, courts, and agencies. This model concludes that courts
are well equipped to review the procedures which agencies follow, but
do not possess the necessary expertise to review the substance of ad-
ministrative decisions. 43
The procedural model predominated at the federal level from the
1930's until the early 1980's. Beginning with the Great Depression,
there was a fundamental change in the perception of the proper role
of government. Public acceptance of market autonomy was replaced
with a commitment to extensive government control of economic and
social activity." The result was the rise of an entirely different admin-
istrative law model in what Richard Stewart has termed "the New
Deal constitutional revolution. '4 Stewart sums up the political re-
sponse concisely, "Congress created the regulatory and social welfare
programs of the New Deal and Great Society, and established vast
administrative bureaucracies to implement these programs. '"46 Statu-
tory delegations no longer specifically identified what an agency was
to do and how it was to do it, but with ever greater frequency merely
identified a general problem. In stark contrast with the Railway Safety
Act discussed above, Peter Strauss noted that in the enactment of the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Congress did
not debate any of the major issues, but instead simply instructed the
agency to further motor vehicle safety. 47
During this era, the courts abandoned much of the classical model's
jurisprudence. Not only was substantive due process repudiated," but
41. See McGarity, supra note 30, at 403 (discussion of the influence of the concept of "ad-
ministrative science" and procedural reform reaction).
42. Cass, supra note 14, at 364.
43. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 407 n.89; see also Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
44. Rabin, supra note 20, at 1193.
45. Stewart, supra note 28, at 338.
46. Id. at 338.
47. Strauss, supra note 33, at 430.
48. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), was one of the last major eco-
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the courts also stopped virtually all discussion of nondelegation,4 9
gave ever broader interpretations to agency enabling legislation, ° and
rejected earlier law on dual federalism."1 As an alternative, the courts
began to emphasize the importance of hearings and other procedures
conducted by an agency before decisions were made. 2 Congress, too,
began to focus on process. The federal Administrative Procedure Act
was passed in 1946, creating a host of procedural safeguards for the
exercise of agency discretion." The federal APA was created, in part,
as a counterbalance to the broad delegation of discretion no longer
prohibited by classical jurisprudence.5 4 The courts, seen as well-quali-
fied to oversee legal process, began to remand cases to agencies for
them to conduct additional procedures not specifically required by
statute or due process.5 5 At the same time, review of the substance of
agency decisions was rejected as an improper function for the court.
Not only was this restriction applicable when courts addressed ques-
tions of statutory authority and jurisdiction,5 6 but also with respect to
nomic substantive due process cases. For a review of the doctrine's decline and rejection, see
Robert McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Rebu-
rial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34.
49. Farina, supra note 1, at 484; Bernard Schwartz, "Apotheosis of Mediocrity?" The
Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 141, 149 (1994).
50. Farina, supra note 1, at 485.
51. Stewart, supra note 28, at 338.
52. Shapiro & Levy note that one of the first cases suggesting the use of procedural safe-
guards was, ironically, Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), one of the
very few cases ever invalidating a statute on nondelegation grounds. Shapiro & Levy, supra note
1, at 397.
53. McGarity, supra note 30, at 403.
54. For a review of the history leading up to the adoption of the federal APA, see Paul
Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 CoLusL. L. REV. 258, 264-79
(1978) and McGarity, supra note 30, at 403-07.
55. In later years, the District of Columbia Circuit was particularly inclined to interpret
language of section 553 (the informal rulemaking section) of the APA in an expansive way. See
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 921 (1974); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Automotive Parts and Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968). In other
cases, the court would even require adjudicatory rulemaking procedures not statutorily required.
Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 941 (1976); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also
Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1987
SuP. CT. REv. 345, 348.
56. While the general approach of the procedural model is to give great deference to agen-
cies on questions of law because of their superior knowledge and involvement, there were other
cases during this time concluding that a less deferential role was required. Compare National
Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 11 (1944) (noting that the agency's
experience gave it familiarity with the statute) with Packard Motor Car Co. v. National Labor
Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 485 (1947) (in which no apparent deference was given); see generally
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986),
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review of facts and policy." The role of the judiciary in the procedural
model is thus quite narrow. While providing close scrutiny over the
procedures used in arriving at administrative decisions, it is otherwise
extremely deferential to the agency.
C. The Evaluative Model
The evaluative model 8 focuses on product. Legal analysis centers
on the quality of the agency decision. The model takes form in regula-
tory analysis requirements and in strong rationality review. The un-
derlying objective of this approach is to compel agencies to engage in
careful and documented deliberation before reaching decisions to en-
sure that improper influences and erroneous information are excluded
from the process while all relevant factors are considered. The evalua-
tive model posits that agencies alone cannot accomplish this objective,
so forces external to the agency, and particularly judicial review, must
therefore be used to prompt them. The evaluative model thus shares
with the classical model reliance upon external controls, but differs
from it in that while the classical model is concerned primarily with
the legality of agency decisions, the evaluative model is concerned es-
sentially with their quality. The evaluative model has its roots in
scholarship which began to recognize the political nature of agency
decisionmaking,19 and to suggest the application of formal policy
analysis to public policy questions. 60
The evaluative model became predominant at the end of the 1970's
and the early 1980's. Vast amounts of social and environmental legis-
lation had been enacted which were even more far reaching and less
(in which he concludes that more decisions have followed the Hearst approach). The question
was ostensibly settled-if not entirely as Breyer might have liked-in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984) (describing the famous two-step analysis
which results in high deference in most cases.)
57. In Pacific States Box and Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935), the Court applied a
presumption that some state of facts justifying the agency decision existed, just as it would have
applied a similar presumption in reviewing a statute. This highly deferential standard of review
of matters within an agency's delegated discretion would change under the evaluative model. See
infra note 66 and accompanying text.
58. McGarity, supra note 30, at 415 refers to "cognitive", while Shapiro & Levy, supra
note 1, at 399 refer to the "rationalist" model. Richard Stewart explains both regulatory analysis
requirements and "hard look" judicial review of agency action as reactions tor capture of regula-
tory agencies. Stewart, supra note 28, at 348. He concludes these developments, although rela-
tively new, have already proven that they are incapable of -solving the problem of interest
groups.
59. Shapiro & Levy, supra note i, at 401. Critiques of the procedural model have come
from all parts of the political spectrum, from public choice to civic republicanism.
60. McGarity, supra note 30, at 416, particularly notes the influence of concepts of "com-
prehensive analytical rationality" and "cost-benefit" analysis.
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specific than the economic regulation of the New Deal. 6' As a result,
new concerns with administrative decision making arose. Though ad-
ditional procedural rulemaking requirements by the courts were de-
terred by the U.S. Supreme Court, 62 Congress continued to create
"hybrid" rulemaking in several statutes, 63 which required an agency
to compile additional records of proceedings, receive public testi-
mony, and prepare justification statements." In the executive branch,
there was a rise in regulatory analysis statements, 6  which require
agencies to apply cost-benefit and other forms of formal analysis. In
the judicial branch, the United States Supreme Court adopted the
concept of "hard look" review,66 which had been percolating in the
district courts. 67 All of these developments were designed to serve as
external checks on the quality of agency decision making. The role of
the judiciary in the evaluative model is deferential with respect to
questions of statutory authority and jurisdiction, but more active with
respect to questions involving factual issues and policy.6
61. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 30, at 407-15; Smythe, supra note 13, at 456-58.
62. The landmark decision of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), held that reviewing courts were not to require addi-
tional rulemaking procedures if not required by the federal APA or the Constitution. Statutory
rulemaking requirements, such as those contained in section 553 of the federal APA, are of
course still subject to judicial interpretation. Thus, the pre-Vermont Yankee case of Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C.. Cir. 1973)(requiring public notice of any
studies agency relied upon, based on statutory notice requirement), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921
(1974), has survived. See also Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 436
U.S. 29 (1983) (must use the APA process to create a record to support agency decision).
63. Pierce, et. al. supra note 37, at 312.
64. Id. at 315-16.
65. The Carter administration created "Regulatory Analysis" in Executive Order No.
12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979). The Reagan administration created "Regulatory Impact Analysis"
in Executive Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
66. Judicial review of the factual basis and policy choices represented in an agency rule
adopted under informal rulemaking proceedings is conducted pursuant to the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard under the federal APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Traditionally, and consistent
with the procedural model outlined here, the courts had construed this to require only "mini-
mum rationality" similar to that required in a statute by the Due Process Clause. Pacific States
Box and Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935). "Ifard look" review, in contrast, has been
summarized as having two components. First, it requires the court to ensure the agency itself has
documented that it has taken a "hard look" at the rule, i.e., seriously considered all of the
proper factors. Second, the court takes its own "hard look" at the substance of the decision to
detect bias, inconsistency, lack of logic, absence of factual basis, or anything else to suggest that
it was based on an unacceptable policy judgment. See ARTHUR E. BONFIELV& MICHAEL AsiMow,
STATE AND FEDERAL ADNISTRATrVE LAW, 621-22 (1989).
67. Motor Vehicle Mfr's Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983). At footnote nine, the Court in State Farm expressly rejected application of
minimum rationality as would be applied to a statute under the Due Process Clause, opting for
closer scrutiny and citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975). See the discussion of "hard look" review in BONPmLD & AsMOV,
supra note 66, and in Breyer, supra note 56.
68. One often quoted administrative law scholar, presumably now even more influential,
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III. THE FLORIDA EXPERMNCE
Although Florida's experience has not followed the federal pattern
directly, the models still provide a very useful framework for analysis.
The classical and procedural models provide insight into many of the
provisions of the 1974 Act, particularly when comparing the House
and Senate versions which were ultimately put together by the confer-
ence committee to become the new APA. The models are also useful
in examining administrative law decisions by Florida's courts, because
the courts have been influenced by the procedural model much more
than the classical model. Finally, the major House and Senate bills
affecting rulemaking during the 1994 Regular Session can be seen as
partly arising from dissatisfaction with the prevailing procedural
model constructed by the courts. Some of the solutions proposed in
1994 may be viewed as attempts to revitalize the classical component
of Florida's APA, while others seem best explained as attempts either
to strengthen procedural safeguards or to move Florida toward an ev-
aluative model.
A. The 1974 Innovations
Florida was considering wholesale revision of its Administrative
Procedure Act in the early 1970's, while the federal government was
well settled into the procedural model.69 Although the U.S. Supreme
Court had by this time rather completely abandoned the nondelega-
tion doctrine and the classical model, Florida was not yet willing to do
so. The Supreme Court of Florida had in fact strongly reiterated its
commitment to the principles of the classical model not long before. 70
In the Legislature, there existed a much publicized concern with
"phantom government,'"' which translates into a perception that
has suggested that the present federal system is unstable and that change is likely. He notes that
it would make more sense to have federal courts conduct a stricter review in matters of law, and
a more lenient one in matters of policy. See Breyer, supra note 56, at 397. Interestingly, this is
the allocation of deference chosen by the Florida Legislature in 1974. See infra notes 86-97 and
accompanying text.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 38-57.
70. See Sarasota County v. Barg, 302 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1974); Conner v. Joe Hatton, Inc.,
216 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1968); Dickinson v. State, 227 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1969); Delta Truck Brokers,
Inc. v. King, 142 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1962).
71. See, e.g., Raymond Mariotti, Senator Lewis Shadowing Phantoms, PALM BEACH POST-
TIMEs, Nov. 24, 1974, at D24; John Van Gieson, Bill Tightening State Rules Clears, TALL HAS-
SEE I)EMOCRAT, Apr. 19, 1974. This last article also offers interesting anecdotal evidence of the
source of one of the Act's provisions. Part of the article read:
Rep. Curtis Kiser, R-Dunedin, said state bureaucrats have invented unauthorized
powers to justify their rules. Kiser said a subcommittee that drafted the bill, HB 2672,
was talking about constitutional and statutory authority for rules when an unidenti-
1994]
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agencies were acting outside their delegated power. Many of the legis-
lative concerns, in short, were viewed from the perspective of the clas-
sical model. At the same time, the approach ultimately favored by
Florida's APA could hardly be explained as a refusal to depart from
the past. 72 The Florida Act also drew heavily upon the procedural
model, and implemented both of these models with several elements
that were truly innovative. 73 As a result, chapter 74-310 was unique
legislation, blending elements from both the classical model and the
procedural model in its approach.
The drafting of this new Act really began in 1973 with a bill redefin-
ing "rule" and "agency" in the 1961 Administrative Procedure Act.
House Bill 2145 passed the House and Senate, but was vetoed by the
Governor. Before the next session, a House subcommittee continued
its hearings and its staff began working with the Florida Law Revision
Council, which had adopted the complete revision of chapter 120 as
its major goal for 197474 and had selected Arthur England, Jr. as re-
porter for the project. At England's request, an ad hoc task force was
put together by the Center for Administrative Justice of the American
Bar Association to prepare an initial draft. 7 The Task Force focused
on fairness and expanded process,' 6 in harmony with the prevailing
procedural model of federal administrative law. The draft contained
fled state official asked, "What about our inherent rule-making authority?" "That's
the point," Kiser said. "They don't have any, and that's so typical of the attitude that
has grown up."
The APA bill which subsequently passed the House contained the simple declaration: "No
agency has inherent rulemaking authority." Representative Kiser was a member of the confer-
ence committee, and this language was included in the final version of the bill which became
subsection 120.54(13), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974).
72. The Chairman of the Rulemaking and Public Information Committee of the Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States wrote in 1975: "In enacting this comprehensive reform in
the administrative procedures of state agencies, the Florida legislature has drawn upon the legal
thinking and experience of the 1970's, rather than the 1940's when the last major administrative
procedure acts were conceived." Cornelius B. Kennedy, A National Perspective of Administra-
live Law and the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 65 (1975).
73. Three of these innovations, a legislative review committee, administrative rule chal-
lenges, and compartmentalized judicial review, are briefly discussed here. For more discussion of
judicial review and two other innovations of the Act see Stephen T. Maher, We're No Angels:
Rulemaking and Judicial Review in Florida, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 767-84 (1991), arguing that
the Act's effort to create an opportunity to present evidence and argument in rulemaking suc-
ceeded, but that the draw-out proceeding and limitations on the scope of review have been
largely ignored by the courts.
74. Brief History of Administrative Procedure Reform, July 1, 1974 (legislative staff docu-
ment) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 333, carton 18, Tallahassee Fla.)
[hereinafter Brief History].
75. Id.
76. The ad hoc committee draft concentrated on "expanding the procedures by which deci-
sions of adjudication and rulemaking could be made" to give agencies "greater flexibility" and
the public a greater "ability to be heard." Kennedy, supra note 72, at 66.
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several innovations: mandating full availability of all agency deci-
sions; enhancing public participation; minimizing distinctions between
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial actions; and compartmentalizing
judicial review. 77 After several cycles of public hearings before the
Council and the subcommittee followed by revisions, the Council
adopted a fifth draft with few changes and it became the starting
point for both House Bill 2672 and Senate Bill 892.78
This basic Law Revision Council draft still had to make it through
the Legislature, however. First there was the committee process in
each house, and then the conference committee. The Senate, in partic-
ular, was the source of many provisions7 9 which reflected the classical
model of administrative law. When the bill finally passed, several ad-
ditions had been made to the Law Revision Council's draft. Subsec-
tion 120.54(12), Florida Statutes provided, "[n]o agency has authority
to establish penalties for violation of a rule unless the Legislature
when establishing a penalty specifically provides that the penalty shall
apply to rules." 0 Subsection 120.54(13) provided," [n]o agency has in-
herent rule making authority."" Paragraph 120.54(10)(a) directed the
newly created Administrative Procedures Committee to examine each
proposed rule to determine "whether the proposed rule is within the
statutory authority on which it is based, as a legislative check on legis-
latively created authority." 2 Subsection 120.54(3) permitted a hearing
officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings to determine if a
proposed rule was "an invalid exercise of validly delegated legislative
authority"83 or "an exercise of invalidly delegated authority. '8 4 Sub-
77. Some of these procedural innovations are discussed in Maher, supra note 73.
78. Brief History, supra note 74. Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 892, as amended by
the conference committee, was to become chapter 74-310, the Administrative Procedure Act.
Ch. 74-310, 1974 Fla. Laws 952.
79. Fla. CS for SB 892 (1974).
80. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(12) (Supp. 1974); see also FLA. CoNssT. art 1, § 18.
81. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(13) (Supp. 1974). See supra note 71 for the likely source of this
declaration.
82. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(10)(a) (Supp. 1974). As the APA was originally enacted, this was
the only criterion for committee review of rules. Compare sections 120.545(1)(a) through (m) in
the current Act.
83. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3) (Supp. 1974). Originally this basis of invalidity was solely that
the rule was beyond the agency's power under its enabling statute. See Patricia Dore, Rulemak-
ing Innovations Under the New Administrative Procedure Act, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 97, 98
(1975); ARTHUR ENGLAND & HAROLD LEVINSON, FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE MANUAL,
Ch. 10, p. 15, note 55. (Supplemented by Johnny C. Burris, 1993) The phrase "invalid exercise
of delegated legislative authority" was later defined in the Act more broadly to codify court
decisions, ch. 87-385, 1987 Fla. Laws.
84. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3) (Supp. 1974). This second ground was later declared unconstitu-
tional because it would allow a hearing officer to declare a statute to be invalid, Department of
Admin. (Div. of Personnel) v. Department of Admin. (Div. of Admin. Hearings), 326 So. 2d
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section 120.56(2) allowed a hearing officer to invalidate an existing
rule on the same two grounds. 5 These additions to the original bills
were attempts to establish substantive limitations on the authority of
agencies and to create innovative external controls on the exercise of
administrative power. If the procedural model was the mother of the
Florida Administrative Procedure Act, the classical model was its fa-
ther.
B. Deference and Standards of Review
Standard of review can best be described as the amount of
deference" that a reviewing court will give the agency decision or ac-
tion under review . 7 Standards of review used by courts in reviewing
administrative action are important because in our tripartite system of
government the courts bear ultimate responsibility for validating
agency action. The provisions on judicial review of agency action are
thus central to the operation of any administrative law system.8 Only
with the cooperation of Florida's judicial branch could the compro-
mises of the 1974 Act be effective. The APA's compartmentalization
of judicial review sought to increase the clarity and comprehensiveness
of standards of review.8 It required that judges deal separately with
issues of procedure, law, fact, and policy, and provided a different
standard of review for each.9
The 1974 Act requires no deference to agency actions with respect
to procedure. The court must review the procedures itself, and if the
court finds that a material error may have impaired either the fairness
of the proceedings or the correctness of the action, the court is to
remand the case.91 It does not matter if the agency found no material
error. It does not matter if the agency determined there was an error
which did not impair the fairness of the proceeding. The court is to
make its own independent finding, and the statute contains no sugges-
187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). The Legislature repealed this language in chapter 76-131, 1976 Fla.
Laws.
85. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(2) (Supp. 1974).
86. Complete deference would be the equivalent of no review at all, that is, whatever the
agency determined would be automatically upheld. The opposite extreme would be no deference,
that is, completely independent review of the matter, with no regard for what the agency de-
cided. For a discussion of deference which demonstrates how confusing "degrees" of deference
can become, see John C. Bilzor et al., Project: State Judicial Review of Administrative Action,
43 ADMIN. L. REv. 571, 721-30 (1991).
87. Id. at 719.
88. Schwartz, supra note 49, at 160, wrote, "In the end, perhaps, it all comes down to
judicial review."
89. L. Harold Levinson, A Comparison of Florida Administrative Practice Under the Old
and the New Administrative Procedure Acts, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 72, 80 (1975).
90. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.68(7)-(12)(Supp. 1974). See also Maher, supra note 73, at 792-98.
91. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(8) (Supp. 1974).
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tion that any deference should be shown to the agency's conclusions.
Questions of law are treated in a similarly direct fashion under the
1974 Act. The court must consider the provision of law itself. Then, if
the court finds that the agency erroneously interpreted the provision
and that a correct interpretation would compel a particular action, it
is to set aside, modify, or remand the case. 92 The court must again
make its own independent finding.93 The statute does not require that
the agency's interpretation be clearly erroneous 94 to be rejected, nor
does the statute contain any other indication that any deference
should be given to the agency's interpretation.
Agency actions which depend on findings of fact, in contrast, re-
quire some deference. The Act provides that "the court shall not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on any disputed finding of fact." If there has been no hear-
ing which meets the requirements of section 120.57, Florida Statutes,
and the validity of the action depends on disputed facts, the court
must order the agency to conduct a hearing. 9' The court must examine
the record, but is to set aside the action or remand the case only if the
action depends on a finding of fact not supported by competent sub-
stantial evidence.9
Finally, the Act compels virtually complete deference on matters of
discretion. 97 The Act first restates that the exercise of discretion must
92. Id. § 120.68(9).
93. Other than the statement in the reporter's comments (contained in Appendix C of Eng-
land & Levinson, supra note 83, at 27) that Florida's new provisions on judicial review were
intended to provide more precise guidelines than the 1961 MODEL ADwNISTRATE PROCEDURE
ACT, there is little legislative history which specifically sheds light on the intended nature of
judicial review. When the 1981 MODEL STATE ADBENISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT was drafted, it
changed the general approach of the 1961 MODEL STATE ACT and instead followed the lead of
Florida by attempting to require the courts to make separate and distinct rulings on each issue.
The Florida language on questions of law is similar to that of section 5-116 (4) of the 1981 Model
State Act, "agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law." A Reporter of the 1981
Model Act notes: "Section 5-116 clearly authorizes courts determining the validity of agency
rules to substitute their judgment for those of the agencies with respect to questions of law."
ARTHUR BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING 580 (1986).
94. The "clearly erroneous" standard requires substantial deference to be given to the deci-
sion being reviewed. See Bilzor, supra note 86, at 725.
95. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(6) (Supp. 1974).
96. Id. § 120.68(10). In Bilzor, supra note 86, at 727, substantial evidence is described in the
following manner:
If an agency decision or action is supported by substantial evidence, it must be upheld
even though the reviewing court would have reached a different result had it been
considering the matter de novo. The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclu-
sions or inferences from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's de-
cision from being supported by substantial evidence.
See also Adam Smith Enters. Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 553 So. 2d 1260, 1270 n.15
(Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
97. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(12) (Supp. 1974).
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be within lawful authority, and also allows for remand for inconsis-
tency, but otherwise clearly states that the court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency on an issue of discretion.
It can be difficult to separate questions of procedure, law, fact, and
policy.9 8 Florida's Act does not attempt to control this determination,
but once such a determination is made, the legislation prescribes the
appropriate standard of review. In overly simplistic terms, Florida's
Administrative Procedure Act requires strict review of the way an
agency makes a decision, strict review over whether it is lawful, less
strict review over whether it is right, and virtually no review over
whether it is smart.
Another innovation of the Act important to judicial decisions is the
common treatment of quasi-executive, quasi-legislative, and quasi-ju-
dicial actions.99 The APA provides that all agency action is to be re-
viewed pursuant to the same statutory section. 0 0 This section
compartmentalizes review of procedure, law, fact, and policy, as
noted above, but does not distinguish standards of review based upon
the form of the agency action. Even though the record to be reviewed
varies depending on the form of the action, o'0 the standards of review
are identical.
But although the Act goes to great lengths to specify judicial stan-
dards of review, it says nothing about what standards hearing officers
should use when they review rules. As discussed above, the provisions
allowing for rule challenges by hearing officers were not part of the
Law Revision Council draft, and no new language has been added to
the Act to cover such challenges."02 As a result, hearing officers are
left without any statutory standards of review whatsoever. A more
specific definition of "invalid exercise of delegated legislative author-
ity" was later added as section 120.52(8), 101 but no attempt was made
to add standards of review at that time. Instead, the attempt was only
to codify judicial grounds for invalidation of statutes.104
98. Sargentich, supra note 3, at 414.
99. The intent was to cover all agency actions, no matter how the courts had characterized
them before the Act, and to have the same procedures apply whenever substantial interests were
affected. There was a specific intent to legislatively change the result of such cases as Bay Nat'l
Bank and Trust Co. v. Dickinson, 229 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969) which had limited judicial
review because of the nature of the agency action. See Levinson, supra note 89, at 73.
100. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(1) (Supp. 1974)
101. Id. § 120.68(5).
102. Compare the text of the Reporters's Final Draft, March 1, 1974, contained in Appendix
C of England & Levinson, supra note 83, with the text of FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (Supp. 1974).
103. Ch. 87-385, 1987 Fla. Laws 2316.
104. " See Maher, supra note 73, at 816 n.225. Also as a result of the addition of DOAH rule
challenges, subsection 120.68(5), Florida Statutes, contained no indication of what the record
TRA VELER 'S GUIDE
C. Decisions of the Courts
The unusual integration of the procedural and classical models envi-
sioned by the Act was never given the chance to fully develop. In-
stead, courts have generally decided cases based upon the federal
administrative law system. The first -result of this approach was that
the provisions of the Act which attempt to limit agency powers were
gradually undermined in accordance with the then prevailing federal
procedural model. If this pattern continues, the next result may be
that the provisions of the Act which attempt to ensure that the courts
do not substitute their judgment on issues of agency discretion will be
undermined, in accordance with the now prevailing federal evaluative
model.
A comprehensive review of the adoption of federal administrative
law by the Florida courts is beyond the scope of this Article. How-
ever, the critical role played by standards of review makes it possible
for a brief examination of this one area to demonstrate how federali-
zation has occurred, and to illustrate the connection to models of ad-
ministrative law. The Act's innovative provisions on
compartmentalization of judicial review and common treatment of
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial actions have not been followed by
the courts.
As might be expected, in the early years following passage of the
APA there was some adjustment to this new approach to administra-
tive law. But while some decisions seemed to be oblivious of the new
Act, many cases closely followed the provisions on judicial review.
There were decisions by the Supreme Court of Florida involving pro-
cedure, law, fact, and policy which closely adhered to the APA's pro-
visions. 101
would be on appeal from a hearing officer's order. Incredibly, the question of whether the rule
or the hearing officer's order was under review persisted until Adam Smith Enters. Inc. v. De-
partment of Envtl. Reg., 553 So. 2d 1260, 1274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), when it was declared that it
was the hearing officer's order, and not the rule, which was under review.
105. In Keystone Water Co. Inc. v. Bevis, 313 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1975), a question of law arose
as to the interpretation of section 367.12(2)(b), Florida Statutes, with respect to the computation
of a utility's rate base. The court reviewed the statute in light of prior case law, disagreed with
the Commission's interpretation and remanded the case. Although rate making is acknowledged
to require technical expertise, the court did not mention this or give any deference to the Com-
mission's interpretation. The court specifically cited section 120.68(9), Florida Statutes.
The following year, a question involving factual determinations and procedure arose in Flor-
ida v. Mayo, 333 So. 2d I (Fla. 1976). The specific issues were whether sufficient data had been
presented to support an interim rate increase, and whether such an increase could be awarded
after only a preliminary presentation by the utility before the opportunity for cross-examination
had been exercised. The court concluded that it was unable to determine whether the award was
supported by competent and substantial evidence pursuant to 120.68(10), Florida Statutes, be-
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After this hopeful beginning, things began to go awry. Agrico
Chemical Co. v. Department of Environmental Reg. , 10 was a consoli-
dation of three rule challenge cases. It is of concern here because of its
pronouncements on standards of review. The hearing officer's order
stated that "under a claim that a proposed rule is arbitrary, unreason-
able, or factually unsound, the Petitioners must demonstrate that the
rule is so totally unfounded as to be completely beyond reason."'
This language is so foreign to the APA that the only thing that is clear
is that the rule was being challenged because it lacked an adequate
factual predicate. Rather than refer to section 120.68(10), Florida Sta-
tutes, the district court complicated matters by turning to a 1937
United States Supreme Court decision, Thompson v. Consolidated
Gas Corp. 10 The Florida court cited Thompson for the proposition
that the proper test for validity was whether the regulations had a rea-
sonable relationship to the purposes of the statute. The only Florida
authority the court cited was Florida Beverage Corp. v. Wynne,'0 a
rule challenge case brought in the circuit court before the enactment
of the 1974 Act. The court borrowed a quote from Wynne:
Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply that an
agency may make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this Act, the validity of regulations
promulgated thereunder will be sustained so long as they are
reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation, and
are not arbitrary and capricious.'10
Wynne had taken this standard directly from another federal case,"'
adding only the final words, "and are not arbitrary and capri-
cause of inadequate findings in the Commission's orders. The court went on to determine that
there was a material error in procedure that affected both the fairness and the correctness of the
interim rate proceeding, citing 120.68(8), and remanded the case.
Two years later, in Florida Real Estate Comm'n v. Webb, 367 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1978), the
Supreme Court of Florida determined that the District Court of Appeal had erred in reducing a
penalty. It held that imposition of a penalty was a matter of discretion which could not be
overturned by the courts if it was within the permissible statutory range, unless agency findings
were in part reversed. The court not only cited section 120.68(12) but also stated that the APA's
provisions on scope of judicial review provided more "detailed" and "precise" guidelines than
the earlier statute, and that the change allowed for "more consistent" and "predictable" results.
Id. at 203.
106. 365 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
107. Id. at 762.
108. 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
109. 306 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
110. Id. at 202.
111. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356 (1972).
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cious." ' I As if this reliance upon cases that had nothing to do with
Florida's APA was not confusing enough, the quoted test was clearly
explained in the federal case as one used to determine whether a rule
exceeded statutory authority;" 3 it did not apply to review of factual
issues in a rule." 4
All of this might have died quietly, except the Supreme Court of
Florida so liked the test that it adopted it as the standard of review for
rulemaking in General Telephone Co. of Florida v. Florida Public
Service Commission."' In adopting the test, the Florida Supreme
Court explained:
As a quasi-legislative proceeding, our review of the rulemaking is
more limited than would be review of a quasi-judicial proceeding.
The standard of review for a quasi-legislative proceeding must differ
from that for a quasi-judicial proceeding, as a qualitative,
quantitative standard such as competent and substantial evidence is
conceptually inapplicable to a proceeding where the record was not
compiled in an adjudicatory setting and no factual issues were
determined." 1
6
There was no reference to the provisions of chapter 120, nor could
there be, for as noted above,"' the Act provides the same standard of
review for both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial proceedings. Be-
cause the first portion of the test adopted by the court actually relates
to statutory authority and the last portion to factual issues, Agrico
and General Telephone affected not only the independent review stan-
dard of § 120.68(9) on issues of statutory authority for rules, but also
the competent substantial evidence test of § 120.68(10) on issues in-
volving a rule's factual basis.
112. Under the federal APA, "arbitrary and capricious" is the standard courts use when
reviewing agency factual determinations in proceedings such as informal rulemaking. S U.S.C. §
706(2)(A). See Bonfield, supra note 11, at 576.
113. Mourning, at 369. "The standard to be applied in determining whether the Board
exceeded the authority delegated to it under the Truth in Lending Act is well estab-
lished under our prior cases. Where the empowering provision of a statute states sim-
ply that the agency may 'make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act,' we have held that the validity of a regulation promul-
gated thereunder will be sustained so long as it is 'reasonably related to the purposes
of the enabling legislation."
114. See supra text accompanying note 66. Admittedly, the development of federal law has
tended to merge and blur these standards. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 89 and
90, one of the main purposes of the Florida Act was to clarify review by more strictly separating
reviewable issues.
1]5. 446 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1984).
116. Id. at 1067.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
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Meanwhile, the First District Court of Appeal again had an oppor-
tunity to consider judicial review of rulemaking in State Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Framat Realty, Inc. "8 Framat
involved an appeal of an administrative challenge to an existing rule
and a question of legal interpretation. The statute involved provided
that certain residential subdivisions could use individual sewage dis-
posal facilities, if they contained no more than four lots per acre. The
Department's rule provided that "an acre, as defined elsewhere in this
Chapter [it was defined as 43,560 square feet of land], shall not in-
clude the following: paved areas, paved and unpaved rights of ways,
paved roadways, consolidated buildings, foundation drainage, under-
ground water drainage, streams, lakes, ditches, coastal, (sic) waters
and marshes.""19 The hearing officer determined that the statute used
the word "acre" in its usual sense, and that the Department's inter-
pretation of that word was therefore erroneous. The district court of
appeal reversed the hearing officer. The court discussed in detail the
agency rulemaking procedures: the rule notices the agency published;
the workshops it conducted; its involvement of interest groups; the
public hearing it held. The court discussed the public policy reasons
for encouraging rulemaking. It did not discuss the standard of review
set out in § 120.68(9), but instead offered its own test, stating:
If we are to regard seriously the incentives for rulemaking under the
APA scheme, and if we are to credit the deliberative process that the
legislature has prescribed for the development of agency policy, then
surely an interpretive rule emerging from this process should be
accorded a most weighty presumption of validity
Permissible interpretations of a statute must and will be sustained,
though other interpretations are possible and may even seem
preferable according to some views.12 0
The Framat case is an unmistakable application of the premises of the
procedural model' 2 1 of administrative law. The decision is based upon
the conception that sufficient process ensures accurate and politically
acceptable agency decisions. To further this conception, Framat ap-
plied a deferential review standard, allowing any "permissible inter-
pretation." This decision does not support the classical model,' 22 with
its concerns about strict limitations on authority; nor does it support
118. 407 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
119. Id. at 240.
120. Id. at 241-2.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 38-57.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 21-37.
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the language of section 120.68(9), which does not provide a deferen-
tial standard of review on questions of law.
Like Agrico, Framat distinguishes review of rulemaking from re-
view of other agency action, though no provision of chapter 120 pro-
vide for this. Also like Agrico, Framat has been cited numerous
times"'2 -though not yet by the Supreme Court of Florida-and it has
had a marked effect on Florida administrative law.
The differing standards for judicial review of rules enunciated in
Agrico and Framat have multiplied. They have been crossed with each
other and with statutorily based standards to create still more stan-
dards. Finally, in 1989, the First District Court of Appeal acknowl-
edged that there was a problem with the standard of review for
"informal" rulemaking in its decision in Adam Smith Enter., Inc. v.
Department of Environmental Reg.. But the court misstated the
problem when it wrote in its opinion that a standard had "never been
clearly stated" and that this had been the "source of much confu-
sion." The source of the considerable confusion was not that the stan-
dard had never been articulated; but to the contrary that it had been
articulated far too many times, seldom in the same way twice, and
almost never with reference to the governing statute. Unfortunately,
Adam Smith did little to resolve the confusion, and even added a few
complications of its own.
Given the dismal state of affairs before the Adam Smith opinion, it
is perhaps unfair to be too critical of this decision. It did conduct a
detailed and largely accurate review of the provisions of the APA, and
it did impose some order on the chaos. 21 It imposed this order, how-
ever, at some cost. Just as the Agrico and Framat cases declined to
follow chapter 120 and looked instead to federal law to create a dis-
tinction between rulemaking and adjudication, Adam Smith declined
to follow chapter 120 and looked to federal law to create a distinction
between formal and informal rulemaking.
The federal APA sets up two kinds of rulemaking, formal and in-
formal. 2 6 In general, rules adopted by the informal process may be
123. In late 1994, Shepard's Citations lists 20 cases citing headnote two, relating to "permis-
sible interpretations."
124. 553 So. 2d 1260, 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
125. For a time, the courts appeared to accept competent substantial evidence as the proper
standard of review in reviewing a DOAH order, as decreed by Adam Smith Enters. Inc. v. De-
partment of Envtl. Reg., 553 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). However, cracks have already
appeared in this facade of order. See Department of Labor and Employ. Sec. v. Bradley, 636 So.
2d 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Stuart Yacht Club & Marina v. Department of Natural Resources,
625 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Department of Correct. v. Hargrove, 615 So. 2d 199 (Fla.
1st DCA 1993).
126. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556, 557. Ironically, while Adam Smith sought to create informal and
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invalidated if they are "arbitrary and capricious," while rules adopted
by the formal process are held to the higher "substantial evidence"
standard. In Florida, the First District Court of Appeal adopted this
distinction to justify review of some rulemaking under the first of
these standards, and review of other rulemaking under the second. 2,
Upon first consideration, the opinion seems logical. It makes the ar-
gument that rules undergoing a section 120.54(3) proceeding do not
have a sufficient evidentiary record to allow application of the "com-
petent substantial evidence" standard, while appeals from DOAH
hearing officers do. The court cited General Telephone and Agrico as
authority. But as shown earlier, General Telephone has been inter-
preted to distinguish all rulemaking from adjudications regardless of
how the cases arrive for review, and Agrico itself involved a DOAH
appeal. In fact, several jurisdictions do apply substantial evidence re-
view without a record generated by formal procedures, 12 and there is
very little practical difference in the standards. 12 9
But more basically, the problem with the Adam Smith solution is
that according to the APA, Florida has only one type oi rule. Rules
going to the court on direct appeal following their adoption, which
Adam Smith terms "informal rulemaking" are adopted in exactly the
same way as rules going to the court following an administrative rule
challenge proceeding. Unlike the federal system, the difference is not
in the adoption process of the rules, but in the review process. More
to the point, the APA provides the same, standard of review for all
agency action, regardless of its form. If petition for direct review fol-
lowing adoption of a rule is filed, and the challenge concerns factual
formal rulemaking in Florida, both Congress and the federal courts have often concluded that
neither is satisfactory and have sought to create a middle ground. Each has created "hybrid-
rulemaking." See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
127. This distinction was not historically accurate simply because there were too many exam-
ples to the contrary. For instance, there were numerous appeals from DOAH rule challenges that
were reviewed using the arbitrary and capricious standard. See, e.g., Fairfield Communities v.
Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Comm'n, 522 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Of
course, this is not to criticize Adam Smith's attempt to provide consistent guidance for the fu-
ture.
128. See Maher, supra note 73, at 817-18 n.228.
129. It is ironic that Adam Smith Enters. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 553 So. 2d 1260
(Fla. 1st DCA 1989) went to such lengths to justify the application of "arbitrary and capricious"
review in some cases and "substantial evidence" in others, when many commentators agree that
it is almost impossible to distinguish the two types of review in practice. In fact, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held, years before the Adam Smith
opinion, that the "substantial evidence" test and the "arbitrary and capricious" test applied to
findings of fact were identical. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Board of
Governors, 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also Pierce, et al. supra note 37, at 341-42 (pre-
dicting and advocating that soon only one test would be applied, to eliminate the "unnecessary
confusion" now affecting the law).
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issues, the courts need only follow the direction of sections 120.68(6)
and 120.68(11) to create and review a factual record. 30 These provi-
sions have been in the Act since 1974, and there was no need for the
Adam Smith court to create the fiction of "informal" and "formal"
rules in Florida.13 1
Further, the Adam Smith solution does not help resolve the con-
flicting standards of review used when interpretations of law are in-
volved. This is because it is difficult to explain why the law should be
interpreted differently depending on the form of the proceeding. In
fact, Adam Smith continued to link the "reasonably related to the
purpose of the enabling statute" test for statutory authority with the
"arbitrary and capricious" test for factual issues. 3 2 In so doing, it
endorsed this federal standard, but apparently only for direct appeals.
In its valiant attempt to resolve the confusion surrounding standards
of review for questions of fact, Adam Smith thus arrived at an illogi-
cal conclusion which increases the confusion surrounding standards of
review for questions of law.
Yet the most significant result of the Adam Smith case ultimately
may stem from its attempt to define "arbitrary and capricious" by
reference to federal law. The Overton Park"' citse, quoted in Adam
Smith, brings with it a host of issues. Overton Park is generally seen 34
as the first federal case presaging the "hard look" doctrine, later
strengthened and developed in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of
the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 3 5
As discussed earlier,' 3 6 the "hard look" doctrine is strongly associated
with the evaluative model of administrative law. It was not simply the
quotations from Overton Park which suggest movement towards the
evaluative model. Adam Smith also sought to enhance the records re-
quired in rulemaking, 3 7 and repeatedly referred to the critical role of
"reason" in the rulemaking process. 3 But regardless of whether or
not the Florida courts are consciously attempting to move toward the
130. Section 120,68(15) was added by ch. 92-166, § 10, 1992 Fla. Laws 1679, to eliminate
direct appeal of rule adoptions unless the sole issue is the constitutionality of a rule and there are
no disputed issues of fact, so this situation could not arise today.
131. See supra text accompanying note 126.
132. Adam Smith, 553 So. 2d at 1271.
133. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
134. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 56, at 384.
135. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 58-68.
137. Adam Smith, 553 So. 2d at 1270.
138. Id. at 1273. For a discussion of Adam Smith and the "hard look" doctrine, see Maher,
supra note 73, 815-28.
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evaluative model, continued references to federal administrative law
will only enhance the confusion.
The widely lauded innovations of Florida's APA earned praise
partly because they offered hope that the chaos of the federal admin-
istrative law system could be avoided. 39 The Florida courts, however,
have repeatedly turned to federal cases and adopted portions of that
very different administrative law system. This adoption has been par-
ticularly destructive to the operation of Florida's Administrative Pro-
cedure Act with respect to standards of review. The federal standards
of review have upset the delicate balance between the classical and
procedural models that the Act tried to achieve. It is, of course, not
obvious that the Act's attempt to balance the two models would have
succeeded, but it is clear to many'40 that the rejection of that balance
by the courts in favor of the prevailing procedural model of federal
law has failed.
D. The 1994 Proposals
The Florida Legislature has long been concerned with the exercise
of authority delegated to administrative agencies.'14 In the last several
years in particular, legislators have received an increasing number of
complaints that agencies are "out of control.' ' 42 Although the term
"phantom government"' 4 3 was not often heard, the concerns ex-
pressed during the 1994 Regular Session were quite similar to those of
twenty years ago. Each house of the Legislature sent at least one ma-
jor APA bill concerning rulemaking to the other house.'" These bills
show that both houses agree that Florida's current administrative law
system needs greater control over agency rules, and that amendment
to the APA is the road to that reform. There was no agreement as to
exactly what changes should be made, however, and no major reform
bill passed. Analysis of some of the major bills affecting rulemaking 4
suggests that they reflect different administrative law models.
139. Harold Levinson, The Florida Administrative Procedure Act: 1974 Revision and 1975
Amendments, 29 U. Muun L. Ray. 617, 686 (1975); Bilzor, supra note 86, at 782-84.
140. See supra text accompanying note 16.
141. See Dan R. Stengle & James P. Rhea, Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Legis-
lative Struggle to Contain Rulemaking by Executive Agencies, 21 FL.. ST. U. L. R~v. 415 (1993)
(a well-documented discussion of the Legislature's continuing concern with agency exercise of
delegated legislative authority).
142. See Mann, supra note 16, at 57.
143. See supra text accompanying note 71.
144. See A Brief History of Selected APA Bills in the 1994 Session. 22 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav.
359 (1994).
145. This Article has focused on rulemaking, and no review of Fla. HB 833 or Fla. HB 2429
(1994), relating to substantial interest hearings, has been attempted.
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The first major rulemaking bill to pass the House was House Bill
835.'46 The approach of House Bill 835 almost exclusively reflected the
procedural model 147 of administrative law. The main change to the
Act was a revision of the rulemaking time frames, intended to im-
prove public involvement in the rulemaking process. The bill also
would have expanded the initial rule notice to include more informa-
tion about the economic impact statement, and would have increased
public access to the economic impact statement once it is prepared.
These changes were in the tradition of the procedural model. House
Bill 835 also would have created a final notice which included publica-
tion of changes and would have moved the opportunity to file an ad-
ministrative rule challenge to this later point in the rulemaking
process. This move might have slightly enhanced opportunities to
challenge rules in furtherance of the classical model, but its primary
purpose appears to have been to enhance cooperation between the
public and the agency in the early stages of rulemaking. The restric-
tions on changing a rule after the final notice would have improved
public participation and fairness to the public, also in keeping with
the procedural model. The bill would have improved Administrative
Procedures Committee access to rulemaking information, which may
have marginally improved its review in furtherance of the classical, 48
and evaluative 149 models. Basically, however, the bill would not have
affected the power of an agency to adopt rules or attempt to change
the deliberative process of the agency. 50
The main rulemaking bill originating in the Senate was Committee
Substitute for Senate Bill 1440.'1' The approach of this bill was in ac-
cord with the classical model,"' though it did contain a few provisions
reflecting both the procedural and evaluative models. First, the bill
would have required that the legislature consider additional rulemak-
ing requirements at the time an enabling act was passed. As an overall
concept, this is a classical model requirement because it exercises legis-
lative control over the power delegated to an agency. But the various
options available reflected all of the models: lowest cost alternatives
and economic impact statements are evaluative in nature; additional
146. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1994 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
HousE BILLS at 274, HB 835.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 38-57.
148. See FLA. STAT. § 120.545(I) (a), (b), (g) (1993).
149. Id. § 120.545(1)(0, (h), (i),- (k).
150. Fla. HB 835 (1994).
151. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1994 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
SENATE BILLS at 125, SB 1440.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 21-37.
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workshops follow the procedural model; monthly reports to the legis-
lature and, of course, legislative ratification of rules, are classical.
Other classical model features of the bill included the grant of author-
ity to the Administrative Procedures Committee to file section 120.535
mandatory rulemaking proceedings, a requirement that the Commit-
tee certify that inquiries had been answered before a rule was filed,
the switching of the burden of proof following objection to a rule,
and the suspension of rules. On the other hand, the modifications to
the rule development statement were typically evaluative. Committee
Substitute for Senate Bill 1440 would have required this statement to
include the evidence that the agency relied upon, rejected, and failed
to consider in adopting the rule. As a whole, however, the provisions
of the bill that would have furthered the evaluative and procedural
models were minor in comparison to the many strongly classical fea-
tures."'
A third bill,'5 4 House Bill 237, was predominately evaluative in ap-
proach. As originally filed, it contained a few procedural and classical
model elements, but its main provisions were based upon the evalua-
tive model. 5 It would have required an agency to prepare a written
report in response to evidence submitted in a section 120.53 hearing,
and it would have provided that only a rationale for the rule made a
part of the rulemaking record and actually relied upon by the agency
could be offered in support of the rule during a rule challenge. These
are typical evaluative provisions. There were also extensive amend-
ments that would have further defined and clarified the rulemaking
record, as including agency responses, rationale, and reasons for re-
jecting alternatives. The requirements for final filing of a rule with the
Department of State were amended to require a rationale for the rule
and a copy of the report responding to evidence submitted in public
hearings. Each of these provisions was clearly designed to ensure that
agencies carefully consider all relevant factors and justify their rules
on the basis of those factors. The bill as originally filed also provided
that the Legislature could impose additional rulemaking requirements
or legislative oversight on particular rules. In concept, this is a classi-
cal model requirement. The authorized provisions for additional over-
sight were typical classical provisions, but most of the additional
rulemaking requirements were evaluative, mandating a detailed de-
scription of the agency's consideration of law, facts, and policy in rule
153. Fla. SB 1440 (1994).
154. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATrvE BILL INFORMATION, 1994 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
HousE BILLS at 230, HB 237.
155. See supra notes 58-68.
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development notices and requiring adoption of rules which impose the
lowest net cost. The bill did contain a classical provision which would
have switched the burden of proof following Committee objection to
a rule. It also contained a procedural provision which would have re-
quired the economic impact statement to be available at the time of
initial notice. Nevertheless, the bill was primarily based on the evalua-
tive model. 156
House Bill 237, however, was replaced with a substitute' 7 to ad-
dress concerns of the Governor's Office and to incorporate provisions
from several other bills. 58 As amended, Committee Substitute for
House Bill 237 contained provisions that reflected the classical, proce-
dural, and evaluative models of administrative law. One classical ele-
ment was the creation of section 11.0755, which would have declared
that each legislative chamber shall consider and identify, as each bill is
passed, the appropriate degree of delegated legislative authority.
Other classical provisions would have directed the Joint Administra-
tive Procedures Committee to review statutes authorizing agencies to
adopt rules and make recommendations to appropriate standing com-
mittees; amended the definition of "invalid exercise of delegated au-
thority";'5 9 required agencies to review their existing rules and to
identify those needing legislative clarification of authority; and pro-
vided that rules objected to by the Committee, which the agency did
not act in good faith to change, would carry no presumption of valid-
ity in subsequent rule challenge proceedings. Procedural elements in-
cluded the following: new requirements for rule development notices;
requirements for improved agency participation at rule workshops;
new rule adoption time frames; new public notice provisions for
changes in a proposed rule; the promulgation of new model rules by
the Administration Commission; and agency review of rules to be
clarified, combined, and deleted. Evaluative elements included a re-
written small business and small county impact requirement; a new
156. Fla. HB 237 (1994).
157. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1994 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
HOUSE BILLS at 230, HB 237.
158. Mann, supra note 16, at 58.
159. Curiously, some of the language in Committee Substitute for House Bill 237 had the
effect of decreasing deference to an agency interpretation of the law while other language in the
same bill advocated increased deference. Compare the bill's language providing "a rule does not
acquire a presumption of validity because it has been through the rulemaking process or because
it is within the range of permissible interpretations of the implemented statutes," (rejecting def-
erential review) with the language invalidating a rule which "is not reasonably related to the
purpose of the implemented statutes," (codifying deferential review). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 106-22.
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statement of estimated regulatory costs;' 60 written response to public
concerns when requested; consideration of alternatives offered by the
Small Business Ombudsman; a definition of rulemaking record; and a
strengthened, though more narrowly focused, lowest net cost require-
ment. 161
IV., CONCLUSIONS
The Florida Legislature is apparently committed to greater control
over agency rulemaking. Legislators' dissatisfaction with agency exer-
cise of delegated authority suggests that in their judgment Florida's
attempt over the last twenty years to answer the quintessential ques-
tion of how best"2 to balance control with agency freedom and effi-
ciency has failed. The failure of the procedural model as elaborated
by the Florida courts has prompted the Legislature to seek ways of
improving control over agency rulemaking. During the 1994 Legisla-
tive session, various bills attempting to increase control invoked dif-
ferent conceptual models. Some bills attempted to strengthen existing
components which are based on the procedural model, some sought to
create new elements implementing the classical model, and still others
tried to add provisions grounded in the evaluative model.
While there was an apparent consensus that agencies were not exer-
cising their delegated authority properly, agreement did not seem to
extend much beyond this general statement of the problem. The Legis-
lature may need to further clarify the exact problem or combination
of problems it is trying to correct. Once this is done, the models dis-
cussed here should be of some help in choosing possible solutions,
because different models address different problems." 3
If agency decisions are scientifically unsupportable, or the agency is
weighing improper factors or ignoring proper ones, the deliberative
process of the agency may need strengthening with provisions drawing
on the evaluative model. If agency decisions are being made without
adequate public notice and participation, or if there is an unaccepta-
ble appearance that this is the case, provisions based upon the proce-
dural model may be the best solution. If agency decisions do not
reflect the political consensus of the Legislature, or if these decisions
are going beyond the powers delegated, provisions in the classical
model may be most appropriate.
160. It is not clear if this was an increase or decrease in regulatory analysis, because the new
statement replaced the old economic impact statement. While the new statement seemed more
narrowly focused, it also required more detail.
161. Fla. CS for HB 237 (1994).
162. See supra text accompanying note 1.
163. See supra discussion in notes 147-62.
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Whatever amendments are made, legislative choices must be care-
fully buttressed with careful attention to the standards of review.
Compartmentalization of distinct standards of review for different is-
sues is still a good idea. It is obvious that classification of an issue as
one of procedure, law, fact, or policy is far from an exact taxonomy.
The words of any particular standard are also flexible. Compartmen-
talization would therefore not inappropriately straight-jacket judges.
What it would do, and should be allowed to do, is provide a consis-
tent framework for analysis. Agencies, petitioners, hearing officers
and courts should all know the review standards which will be used
before the agency decision is made, so that evidence and argument in
support of the decision, and in opposition to it, can be directed to that
standard. Uniformity is the most important value. Given the plethora
of existing standards of review, the only hope of clarification is for
someone simply to choose one and write it down somewhere, so every-
one can know what the standard is. The Legislature must be the one
to choose, and the Florida Statutes must be the place to record that
choice.
Because history demonstrates that the courts are unlikely to be
guided by statutory standards, it might be more effective to clarify the
standards of review used by hearing officers. The various bases of in-
validity could be coupled with a clear legislative indication of the
amount of deference to accompany each agency determination. Once
a clear set of standards was in place, the Act could be narrowly ad-
justed in future years to address specific concerns with agency exercise
of delegated authority in a given category, without affecting other ar-
eas that might not need adjustment.
The question confronting Florida endures. The successes and fail-
ures of federal administrative law as well as Florida's own experience
must affect our answer. The administrative law models outlined in
this Article offer new perspectives on the difficult choices to be made.
The philosophical model which underlies our "administrative consti-
tution" is important because it affects not only the authority of ad-
ministrative agencies, but also the very balance of power among the
three branches of Florida's government. While the decision of
whether and how to amend the APA is a legislative one, all parts of
Florida's government and its citizens should contribute to the debate.
Surely, all will be common travelers down the chosen road to reform.
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